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The intersection between law and neuroscience is fertile ground for a variety of issues
that implicate both scientific and philosophical questions. In the context of the crimi-
nal law, the most fertile ground for inquiry is the interplay between states of mind and
judgments of culpability. In their interesting and provocative article, ‘What does neu-
roscience tell us about criminal responsibility?’,1 Uri Maoz and Gideon Yaffe consider
the degree to which neuroscientific research bears on the question of criminal respon-
sibility.Their article is a thorough and informative account of just how neuroscience
can contribute to a better understanding of responsibility for action.
Maoz and Yaffe are clear about the possible impact of neuroscience on law.They
believe that ‘[p]otentially, a neuroscientific result could show that a class of people, or,
perhaps, even, an individual person, fails to meet, or succeeds in meeting, one of the
necessary conditions of criminal responsibility’. (123)The reason they believe this is,
among other things, their claim that ‘criminal behavior . . . has its source in the brain.’
(123)This licenses the conclusion that ‘the neural basis of capacities underlying crimi-
nal responsibilitymight shed new light on the standardswe apply for individuals having
or lacking criminal responsibility.’ (123)
I thinkMaoz and Yaffe are taking up an extremely important and fundamental issue.
But I am not convinced they frame their undertaking in the most perspicuous manner.
The problem, I will argue, is that they conflate two dimensions of human agency that
are distinct and irreducible.
† Professor of Law and Chair in Legal Philosophy and LegalTheory, European University Institute, Florence;
Board of Governors Professor of Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA; Professor of Law
and Chair in International Trade and Legal Philosophy, Swansea University, Wales, UK. My thanks to John
Hyman and StephenMorse for comments on a draft of this article.
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In this comment on their article, I want to suggest that Maoz and Yaffe are at risk in
their undertaking.The fault, I will argue, is not with their arguments as such but with
the concept of ‘voluntary act’ they employ. As I read their arguments, Maoz and Yaffe
assume that ‘voluntariness’ is a feature of human acts and that neuroscience can tell us
something about voluntariness. I want to suggest that this is a mistake. While we can
and, indeed, must assess human action as voluntary or not, that assessment cannot be
decided by scientific facts about the brain.
Maoz and Yaffe begin with the story of Michael. Shortly after turning 40, Michael
developed a strong interest in child pornography.This was followed by a conviction
for child molestation after Michael was found to have inappropriately fondled his
12-year-old stepdaughter. At sentencing, the judge gave Michael the option of avoid-
ing jail by entering a treatment program. Anxious to avoid jail, Michael jumped at the
chance. While in the program, Michael acted inappropriately toward female members
of staff. He complained of headaches the night before hewas supposed to be sentenced,
having been failed and been ejected from the treatment program. AnMRI was ordered
because he showed frank neurological as well as behavioral signs in the neurological
consulting room.The MRI revealed a large orbitofrontal tumor. Once the tumor was
removed,Michael’s bad behavior ceased, his sexual urges for children disappeared, and
he successfully completed his program. Severalmonths after returning home,Michael’s
urges resurfaced together with the return of his tumor. After the tumor was again re-
moved, the urges ceased andMichael remained a free man.
What can Michael’s case tell us about the relationship between neuroscientific re-
search and responsibility?The first thing they say is thatMichael’s criminal behavior ‘is
no different from anyone else’s: such behavior has its source in the person’s brain and
his environment’. (122) But it is not just criminal behavior that has its source in the
brain. In fact, according to Maoz and Yaffe the same is true for sane and insane people
alike: ‘Sanity, like insanity, depends on capacities brains have. And criminal behavior by
the sane, like such behavior on the part of the insane, has its source in the brain.’ (123)
Michael’s behavior is ‘traceable to [his] brain abnormalit[y]’. (121) Once the ab-
normality is removed, Michael behaves like an upstanding citizen.This, it seems, is a
clear case where neurosciencewas able to show ‘My brainmademe do it.’The tumor in
Michael’s brainmay very well be an instance where ‘a neuroscientific result could show
that . . . an individual person, fails to meet, or succeeds in meeting, one of the necessary
conditions of criminal responsibility.’ (123)
The crux ofMaoz andYaffe’s position on the relationship of neuroscientific research
to criminal responsibility is clear.They write: ‘[N]euroscientific studies might illumi-
nate the neural mechanisms that underlie those features of people in virtue of which
they are criminally responsible for their behavior. And so they would help us to un-
derstand criminal responsibility better . . .’ (123) I think there are reasons to doubt the
claim thatdevelopments inneuroscience canhelpusunderstandcriminal responsibility
better.This is not to say that neuroscience is irrelevant to judgments of responsibility.
However, it is to say that our conception of criminal responsibility can in no way be
determined by scientific results.
The line I am attempting to draw is between the conceptual and the empirical. As I
draw that line, Iwant tobe as clear as possible about thepotential roleof neuroscience in
understanding key concepts in the criminal law.The key issue is the role neuroscientific
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evidence plays in judgments of criminal responsibility. Almost everyone will agree that
neuroscience has something to contribute to criminal law. But I think there is more
than a little confusion about how to think about the interplay between the conceptual,
the empirical and the legal.
Let’s start with Michael. It is tempting to say that his tumor is an excusing condi-
tion, so that he should get off. But is it really that easy? StephenMorse suggests not. In
whatMorse describes as ‘the fundamental psycho-legal error’,2 he argues that causation
alone cannot excuse.3 And the reason he thinks this is precisely the same reason given
byMaoz andYaffe: all behavior is caused.As they put it: ‘Michael’s criminal behavior . . .
is no different from anyone else’s: such behavior has its source in the person’s brain and
his environment.’ (122)Morse,Maoz and Yaffe all agree: if causation is an excuse, then
no one is guilty of anything. But they all reject this conclusion.
Which takes us back toMichael. IfMichael cannot simply claim ‘the tumormademe
do it’, then why does he get off?Maoz and Yaffe gesture at an answer to this question in
the following remark: ‘If it could be shown, for instance, that people with orbitofrontal
tumors like Michael’s typically meet the law’s criteria for insanity, then such research
would provide some support for the claim that Michael was not criminally responsible
for his behavior by supporting the claim that he had an insanity defense.’ (123)
Maoz and Yaffe make two points. First, consider the quote above regarding the as-
sociation of personswith orbitofrontal tumors and insanity. Although the association is
between tumors and insanity, it could just as easily have been between insanity and any
other characteristic. Suppose it turned out that there was a high correlation between a
rare blood type and insanity. Just as with states of the brain, such evidencewould be rel-
evant and possibly probative. Its strength as evidence would come not from the nature
of the condition but simply from the strength of the statistical correlation. In assessing
Michael’s guilt, or the availability of the defense of insanity, the brain evidence qua ev-
idence enjoys a qualitative status no different from any other type of evidence. It is a
mistake to say, asMaoz and Yaffe do, that ‘neuroscience can . . . inform our understand-
ing of the features of human beings in virtue of which they are criminally responsible
for their behavior.’ (122)
The second argument by Maoz and Yaffe concerns the role of neural mechanisms
in judgments of criminal responsibility.This is their claim: ‘[N]euroscientific studies
might illuminate the neuralmechanisms that underlie those features of people in virtue
of which they are criminally responsible for their behavior.’ (123)The example they
provide is voluntary action.As they say, correctly, ‘criminal responsibility requites a vol-
untary act.’ (124) It is certainly true that evidence regarding underlying neural mech-
anisms is potentially useful in assessments of responsibility. But the issue is how such
evidence is useful. Two points are apt for comment.
Thefirst point concerns integrationof neuroscientific evidence into the criminal law.
The criminal law requires evidence of mental states, among them intention and reck-
lessness. Can neuroscience illuminate the content of these mental states at the level of
individual assessment?This is an empirical issue and the evidence, to date, suggests that
2 Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1660 (1994).
3 For a recent, detailed discussion of the point, see Michael S. Moore, Stephen Morse on the Fundamental Psycho-
Legal Error, 10 CRIM. LAW & PHILOS. 45, 89 (2016).
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neuroscience is a long way frommaking a definitive contribution.The trouble lies with
the primary technical tool of neuroscience, the fMRI.4
The second issue is conceptual. In order to employ neuroscientific evidence in the
criminal law context, it is necessary to have perspicuous legal concepts to which neu-
roscientific evidence might be attached. Consider voluntary action. Maoz and Yaffee
point out that ‘criminal responsibility requires a voluntary act’. (5)Their definition of
voluntary act is as follows: ‘a voluntary act is a bodily movement guided by a conscious
mental representation of that bodilymovement.’ (5)Maoz andYaffe devote a large part
of their article to discussion of Libet’s experiments in connectionwith voluntary action.
Regrettably, the conception of voluntary action they advance is arguably confused.
In defining voluntary action as they do,Maoz andYaffe assimilate voluntariness into
psychology.They think voluntariness is a state of mind.This is an error. Voluntariness
is not a psychological notion: it is a normative notion. As JohnHymannotes,5 ‘the basic
function of the concept is to inform the appraisal of individual conduct and in particular
the assessment of innocence and guilt, and we cannot understand its structure if we do
not understand its function, anymore than we can understand the structure of the liver
if we believe its function is to make blood . . .’ (77)
How do we assess the voluntariness of an act? Hyman suggests ‘a certain thing is
done voluntarily if, and only if, it is not done out of ignorance or compulsion. This
is not the same as saying that it is done knowingly and freely.’ (77) Voluntariness is
best understood negatively. An act is voluntary unless it is the product of ignorance or
compulsion.
Neuroscience is potentially quiteuseful inmaking judgments about criminal respon-
sibility. At the moment, the science is not quite sufficiently developed to domore than
provide a promise for the future. Additionally, more work needs to be done in figur-
ing out just what we mean when we employ some of the key concepts of the criminal
law, chief among them the notion of a ‘voluntary act’. Maoz and Yaffe clearly think that
neuroscience can make a real contribution to enhancing the tools of the criminal law.
However, they are modest in their claims for the power of neuroscience to fundamen-
tally change the way we think about criminal responsibility.They are clearly not suffer-
ing from what StephenMorse has termed ‘Brain Overclaim Syndrome’.6
4 For an excellent assessment of the limits of fMRI technology, see Walter Glannon, What Neuroscience Can
(and Cannot) Tell us About Criminal Responsibility, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
14, 31(Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
5 The discussion that follows relies upon JOHNHYMAN, ACTION, KNOWLEDGE ANDWILL (OUP, 2015).
6 Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, FACULTY SCHOLAR-
SHIP, 2006 Paper 117, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty scholarship/117.
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